Lumpers and Splitters in Science

In every field that categorizes information, lumpers and splitters can be found in opposition. In biology, lumpers tend to classify organisms broadly despite significant differences, while splitters focus on finer distinctions based on smaller variations. Dawkins appears to align more with the splitter perspective.

While splitters are not inherently incorrect—small genetic variations can lead to significant impacts, such as increased virulence in microorganisms—this reasoning does not apply to human classifications. There is no valid rationale for categorizing humans by race, though race-based medicine often assumes such distinctions are meaningful.

The problem with race-based medicine, aside from its tendency to promote racial profiling, lies in its general approach: people are inherently diverse.

This raises an important question: why do certain medications work for some individuals but not for others? The simplified answer is that we each possess unique genotypes, affecting how we metabolize drugs. While population-level prescriptions may be economically beneficial, they often fail to provide effective medical solutions. This has led to a growing emphasis on personalized medicine.

The Complexity of Human Diversity

You might wonder how I can argue that we are all different while also maintaining that we cannot be neatly categorized into races. To clarify: we share a common humanity and exhibit considerable genetic uniformity, yet there are genetic variations among individuals that, despite being minor, can significantly influence medication efficacy.

The belief in race disregards both of these realities. It presupposes that individuals within one racial category differ fundamentally from those in another and that those within the same category are largely identical. In truth, the genetic variation within what we label as "races" is greater than that between them.

Historically, human nature has included tendencies toward racism and territorialism. However, we have also engaged in significant intermingling, resulting in a biological diversity akin to a box of assorted chocolates. Though we may present various appearances, fundamentally, we share the same biological essence.

To illustrate this point, consider a 2002 editorial in Nature Biotechnology, which aptly noted, "Using genetics to define race is like slicing soup. You can cut wherever you want, but the soup stays mixed."

This blending illustrates why superficial traits (like skin color or hair type) are inconsistently distributed across populations and why categorizing individuals based solely on appearance is not beneficial.

The Reality of Human Similarities

Ultimately, while we may notice differences among ourselves, these are vastly overshadowed by our shared characteristics. Acceptance of "race" necessitates agreement with the arbitrary distinctions it implies. This is why race is fundamentally a social construct rather than a biological one. Its existence hinges on our perception, fading away when we cease to believe in it.

Evelynn Hammonds, a professor at Harvard, powerfully stated, “Race is a human invention… we made it, we can unmake it.” Future generations may view our current notions of race with the same disbelief we reserve for outdated beliefs, like the idea that the Earth is flat. This analogy is worth pondering, as appearances may deceive, but our fundamental biological truths remain constant.

You can embrace biological diversity without clinging to outdated concepts of race. Our current understanding falls short of capturing the true breadth of human biological diversity, highlighted by the fact that greater genetic variations exist within what we classify as races than between them.

Guy P. Harrison remarked in Race and Reality that confronting both racism and the belief in race can lead to a more equitable world, one enriched by dismantling the false barriers we’ve constructed.

Even Dawkins, in The Ancestor’s Tale, acknowledges the social detriment of racial classifications while arguing their informative value. He notes that while "racial classification is of no social value and is positively destructive of social and human relations," it can still provide insights into certain characteristics. For example, stating "Suzy is Chinese" might lead one to assume specific physical traits.

This reasoning parallels our earlier discussion about microorganisms: while informative differences among strains are significant, the relevant differences among humans relate to health—specifically, one’s genotype rather than race.

Dawkins’ acknowledgment of the destructive nature of racial classifications contrasts with his argument for their informative utility, leading him to label race as “irrelevant to anything that matters.” This perspective may stem from his privilege as a white man, where race may not impact his reality.

In truth, race holds relevance for many, albeit for troubling reasons. The belief in race lays the groundwork for racism. While I do not believe Dawkins harbors racist sentiments, his assertion that race is biologically real lends credence to a concept that should not define individuals.

In attempting to rationalize the indefensible, we often align our biases with natural laws. Dawkins views race as biologically real, much like religious beliefs, yet both are mere constructs of our imagination—concepts we elevate to factual status to assert dominance over others.

Race does not exist. However, as long as we maintain the illusion of its existence, racism will persist.

Jonathan Meddings is an author and advocate from Melbourne, Australia. This article originally appeared in the June 2016 edition of Australian Rationalist.