Introduction

Following the recent dissemination of my article “Determined, or Not?”, where I analyzed Dr. Robert Sapolsky's insights from his latest book, Determined, several intriguing questions have emerged. A key inquiry revolves around how the notion of a virtual layer superimposed on the brain's neurobiological framework contributes to our understanding of consciousness. Additionally, the influence of thermodynamics and entropy on consciousness has come into question. Strikingly, the existing literature often overlooks the apparent correlation between the mind's abstraction capabilities and the conclusion that consciousness may involve a virtual mechanism operating over the deterministic biological processes that Sapolsky describes. This perspective could potentially pave the way to address the neurobiological underpinnings of conscious thought, and this brief paper will further explore this concept, serving as an adjunct to my earlier work. Essentially, this virtual layer could help us transition from merely observing phenomena to probing the reasons behind their occurrence, leading to a more sophisticated model that can yield precise predictions about subjective experiences.

Interestingly, there is a notable overlap between current empirical findings on consciousness and the exploration of interpersonal relationships. This connection seems reasonable, given that evolutionary mechanisms tend to preserve life-sustaining processes; thus, an evolutionary lens can enhance our comprehension of a virtual inner reality that is not strictly determined by the neurobiological operations we can currently examine. If conscious thought were merely a product of accumulated inputs, there would be no necessity for profound inner experiences to accompany an individual's navigation through the world, supporting the behaviorist perspective. Therefore, with patience, we may eventually formulate a theory of consciousness that aligns with empirical evidence, even if consciousness ultimately proves to be more than just a mechanistic occurrence.

A dual challenge exists within the realm of consciousness: one pertains to rational cognition, while the other relates to irrationality. These two distinct yet observable traits coexist within every human mind, yet most theories of consciousness tend to address only one of them. A significant obstacle in contemporary efforts to elucidate consciousness lies in the ability of conscious systems to err, as well as to succeed. Much like a quantum computer that outputs a comprehensive range of theorems before honing in on a specific result, conscious thought can be analogized. Digital computers exhibit a similar quality in that the operations performed by the processor may not directly correlate with the user's experience. This analogy will help us delve into the concept of a virtual layer within conscious experience.

Van Eyck Phreaking vs. Neuroimaging Techniques

Let us draw a parallel between the conscious mind and a scenario depicted in Neal Stephenson’s Cryptonomicon, where a hacker employs Van Eyck phreaking to observe another's laptop. The individual at their computer, believing they are alone, mirrors the relationship between the mind and the body. However, unlike the hacker's ability to covertly access the laptop, the scientist utilizing advanced techniques to probe the brain lacks similar insights. Understanding this disparity can shed light on the consciousness conundrum in clearer terms.

Van Eyck phreaking involves an external party utilizing intelligent analysis of radiation to compromise a computer system. In essence, it is feasible to replicate the contents of a computer screen on another device without the user's awareness. The crucial takeaway is that electromagnetic radiation can help discern internal processes within a computer's user interface, much like neuroscientific methodologies such as fMRI and EEG that monitor brain activity through the electromagnetic signals generated by neural function. However, we grapple with the challenge of comprehending the true nature of the user interface when examining human brains. This complexity arises partly from the uniqueness of individual bodies and perspectives, which makes it difficult to draw analogies from one mind to another. Moreover, a specific input does not consistently produce a distinct output, as the neural pathways through which inputs must navigate to reach consciousness modify the raw sensory data captured by our senses, often rendering it unrecognizable compared to lived experiences.

To elaborate, Van Eyck phreaking is viable chiefly because we possess a detailed understanding of computer screens and can interpret a user's intentions based on their interactions with the interface. In contrast, our understanding of consciousness lacks this navigational advantage; we do not possess the technical specifications necessary to view the process we are observing from its own perspective. A recent paper co-authored by Yoshua Bengio outlines scientific theories of consciousness while investigating the potential consciousness of artificial intelligence systems (Butlin, 2023). While the review provides a high-quality overview of various scientific theories, it notably lacks a concept analogous to the user interface. Furthermore, starting from the assumption of computational functionalism limits the exploration of potentially enlightening avenues regarding consciousness.

Conversely, renowned neuroscientist Antonio Damasio frequently references a “screen” in his writings (Damasio, 2018). This notion implies that each of us embodies a virtual self-process generated by our central nervous systems, deeply rooted in our biology and metabolic needs. Damasio posits that this screen represents our fundamental level of conscious experience, which encompasses more than just visual stimuli. Psychologists investigate this concept through experiments involving sleep deprivation, observing the diminishing awareness of stimuli over time. When deprived of sleep, activation in the prefrontal cortex, associated with abstract thinking, decreases, while activity in the brainstem, linked to older, foundational brain functions, increases.

By studying individuals’ conscious processes, particularly those with neurological injuries, we can identify issues ranging from general indeterminacy to awareness deficits and misinterpretation of intentions. These fundamental breakdowns in brain function offer valuable insights into the neurological systems intertwined with consciousness. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that consciousness remains an unsolved puzzle! We still have much to learn, and it is inadequate to assert that “everything is deterministic,” despite the existence of deterministic phenomena in the world. The search for functional deterministic neurological circuits corresponding to observable behaviors may be what drives our instinct to detect patterns (Daniel, 2023; Lent, 2017).

The screen of consciousness represents our internal model of the external world. The challenge of perceiving this screen lies in our reliance on it to comprehend itself. Nevertheless, Damasio argues that what begins as a basic drive to ensure metabolic continuity evolves into a complex virtual process, often bearing little resemblance to the reality it signifies. As we remain conscious of our surroundings, we can act freely within its constraints. However, under unhealthy conditions, in sickness, or due to aging, our internal model of the world may falter, making it harder to remember, learn, and effect desired changes. Asserting that consciousness is determinate implies that it is functioning optimally, which, regrettably, is not always the case.

Entropy is linked to determinism in consciousness, as high-entropy situations tend to be distressing. This relationship manifests when a high-entropy mismatch between one's internal worldview and external environment complicates the ability to consciously decide and execute actions. In such cases, either the intended action becomes unfeasible, or its outcome is unforeseen. Neurons that model environmental predictions, primarily through dopamine mediation, will register subpar predictions, resulting in an unpleasant experience. Thus, high-entropy conditions negatively impact our physical well-being; historically, excessive entropy has correlated with challenges in maintaining metabolic function, prompting us to instinctively avoid such states.

Virtual Conscious Processes

The activities we consciously recognize, such as my writing or your reading, represent a minor fraction of our mental and bodily experiences. The randomness inherent in word choice or pronunciation unveils an author's background or a reader's vocabulary development approach. Various methods exist for conveying a message, and determining the most effective one relies on past experiences in similar contexts. Repeating this process shapes strategies to optimize future outcomes. Thus, I describe the specific content of a message as arbitrary, acknowledging that substantial causal invariance exists in speech acts. However, straying too far from a message's comprehensibility can lead to communication failures.

This communication process suggests that the past influences the future, yet the diverse idiosyncrasies observed in individual strategies demonstrate that deliberation and choice are critical factors in shaping outcomes. Consciousness also exhibits considerable flexibility, as evidenced by the behavior of young conscious animals. Even random actions fall within the realm of conscious awareness, and as individuals test and uncover the boundaries of their worlds, they remember these experiences, contributing to future decision-making.

The free will vs. determinism dialectic often misses the mark by neglecting the possibility of a physical basis for a process that, by its nature, cannot be deterministic due to its arbitrary content relative to its biological foundation. While synapses are established based on genetic factors, the specific interplay of genes with an individual's environment at any given time is so complex that it seldom replicates. Even when we manage to elucidate aspects of this interplay, our predictive models often contain inaccuracies. Although consciousness is mediated by biological processes, agency—defined as the capacity to make choices—must not be entirely determined. As agency expands, the underlying biology may undergo surprising transformations, such as the formation or degradation of synapses, or fluctuations in metabolic activity. The potential scope of these processes remains vast, leaving us, as observers, grappling to decipher the neural machinery, which oscillates between different states over time, likely in response to unknown stimuli.

Virtual conscious processes are those we directly experience, tied to the information derived from the brain's immediate feedback loops, both internal and external. Yet, the interactions between this virtual layer and the physical substrate giving rise to them possess an arbitrary element. For instance, the act of walking up a grassy hill to lay down a blanket and enjoy a book encompasses a multitude of internal experiences influenced by literature and the reader's mindset, even while sensory data—like the breeze, sunlight, and grass—remains relatively fixed. Minds navigate this realm of possibilities by acting as filters, aligning with Huxley’s perspective. However, scientific inquiries aiming for objectivity across all minds have often faltered by narrowing their focus to overly simplistic instances of mental activity (Huxley, 1963). Investigating brains at their most fundamental level provides limited insights into the richness of experiences they can generate, suggesting that perhaps we should dive deeper into the complexities of neurobiology to pose more challenging questions.

To account for the array of experiences possible in similar situations is to recognize consciousness's ability to transcend its immediate environment by being arbitrary concerning both external stimuli and corresponding neural activation patterns. Only a virtual consciousness process can clarify the shortcomings in the free will vs. determinism framework, which anticipates a system that operates in a predictable manner. In reality, conscious experiences lack repeatability, and neurons adapt based on their firing patterns, leading to the assertion that "no neuron ever fires the same way twice." The philosophical notion of free will posits that the system can still make choices and take actions, which contradicts laboratory findings demonstrating that damage to neurobiological systems can alter thoughts and actions. Neither extreme of the free will vs. determinism debate (i.e., Hard Determinism or Free Will) captures the entire truth, although both contain relevant insights regarding our observations.

The Function of Cognitive Arbitrariness to Metabolism, at Evolutionary Scale

Arbitrariness plays a critical role in meeting metabolic needs by facilitating a broad spectrum of experiments, ensuring that valuable insights are retained while allowing less successful moments to fade. This cognitive aspect embraces experimentation, nurturing only the processes that succeed. From countless trials, we witness the emergence and evolution of cultural phenomena, yet modeling these within an individual brain remains challenging. Furthermore, the connection between these processes and the metabolic level that underpins them is still unclear. This final section aims to offer a foundational understanding of decision-making as it appears within contemporary cognitive science.

A limitation of Butlin’s review (Butlin, 2023) is that it permits computational functionalism to restrict the breadth of its consciousness inquiry. A more enlightening exploration of conscious thought could transpire if computational functionalism were set aside. The review arguably leaves significant insights regarding the development of artificially conscious machines unexplored by not considering Integrated Information Theory (IIT) or embodied/enactive cognition perspectives. To understand consciousness and its mechanisms and then draw parallels for creating machines that mimic this phenomenon could represent a more effective approach.

An unrelated philosophical consideration pertains to whether the content of consciousness is materially determined prior to its occurrence. Likely, actions become more determined when conscious thinking is simplistic, such as during prolonged wakefulness when the brainstem primarily drives thoughts. Conversely, the creation, availability, and comprehension of increasingly abstract mental concepts enable greater arbitrariness among mental objects, experienced phenomena, and their neurobiological foundations. Nevertheless, all conscious systems likely possess some degree of inner experience.

The collective will of the 37 trillion cells within the human body and its myriad microbial companions produces the machinery enabling a virtual self to process inputs from each collective member and make choices at a level of abstraction that surpasses any individual component's understanding. To argue for a deterministic process underappreciates its capacity to assert influence over the environment, while suggesting that this process can be replicated in silicon overlooks the metabolic will to live expressed through each microorganism's relationship with its environment and neighbors. If consciousness primarily serves as a mode of engagement that ensures the delivery of oxygen and nutrients to every cell in the body, the notion of machine consciousness seems hollow—what would such a machine be conscious of? What would it care about? Potentially something, but the specifics remain elusive. This ambiguity complicates predictions about how current AI systems will learn to reason like conscious minds, as noted by Melanie Mitchell, a prominent cognitive scientist with extensive experience in AI research (Mitchell, 2023).

Current endeavors to reverse-engineer the most successful large language models reveal a degree of determinism, but these systems lack a will to live, making it impossible to contend that they are self-driven. The essence of self lies in sorting abstractions, at least somewhat arbitrarily, and determining which deserve attention. While large language models exhibit a certain level of arbitrariness, their hallucinations appear more as noise than meaningful signals (Elhage, 2021). In a human brain, metabolism serves as a grounding mechanism to discern value; computer systems, lacking this valence component, perceive all data as equivalent.

In summary, much remains unknown about consciousness. The most coherent approximation of conscious thinking hinges on the relationship between arbitrary events and inner experiences—a phenomenon that provides no clear evidence in the free will vs. determinism debate and convolutes discussions by escalating complexity to an unmanageable extent.

Concluding Thoughts

Microprocessors must deliver a fundamental level of deterministic functionality to effectively run programs; however, the selection of which program to execute at a given moment in a silicon chip's lifecycle requires arbitrariness to meet the needs of real users. Evidence from cognitive science thus far suggests that consciousness arises within a biological context as a coordinated effort to reduce entropy, perpetuating successful strategies through genetics across generations of living organisms. Accepting both preceding assertions leads to a perspective of a system that constructs successive layers of deterministic processes to enhance stability and resilience for indefinite propagation in a high-entropy external environment.

Within this unrefined framework, myriad inputs converge onto a single conscious “screen,” facilitated by the various components contributing information to this global process. Neural substrates are fascinating and complex, providing valuable insights, yet the processes they generate require further examination and interpretation to unravel the specific nature of consciousness over time. While many underlying processes may be deterministically chaotic or outright determined, the alignment within a singular mind necessitates both specialized mechanisms tailored to the surrounding environment and accurate models containing the requisite information to continually scale the complexity of conscious thought. Discontinuities in conscious experience offer evidence of this phenomenon, observable in controlled settings through optical illusions and other tricks that mislead the mental model, resulting in inaccurate reports of external states.

Regarding the virtual component of consciousness, it may seem vague yet substantial. The physiological foundations of this virtual process can be meticulously mapped without clarifying our true aim: understanding the conscious experience of life that each individual undergoes. The inherent openness of this integration process—characterized by creativity, arbitrariness, error-proneness, and novelty-seeking—may perpetually resist reductive or mechanistic explanations, but it remains possible to draw broad conclusions on how to enhance it.